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Abstract 
The main objective of this paper is to interrogate the omission in the system of public accountability in the 
Nigerian public sector that has made corruption a monster. It is germane to state that corruption heightens 
wherever systems for ensuring effective accountability are weak. There are internal and external mechanisms for 
achieving accountability in the Nigerian Public life, but it appears that they are ineffective . This is due mainly to 
lack of political will in redressing the corruption dilemma. Additionally, the Nigerian penal (code) system or 
sanctions for weighty crimes such as corruption are weak and serve no deterrence to actual and potential 
offenders . The paper is segmented into : Abstract, Introduction ; Conceptual clarification ; Corruption and 
Public Accountability in Nigeria: A Discourse, Conclusion and recommendations . In order to rise above this 
challenge and make progress, the fallen status of our laws must be addressed through pragmatic implementation 
and committed leadership anchored on sound values and practice. 
Keywords: Corruption , Accountability, Transparency, Public Sector 
 
1.Introduction 
Corruption is a global issue, but it varies in intensity, sophistication and forms from country to country. The 
deduction or inference from extant literature, public commentaries, analyses , media (print and broadcast) 
including social networks seem to suggest that corruption is the largest industry with many practitioners in 
Nigeria. This has a lot of implications for development generally in the country. It is therefore not surprising that 
Adegbite (2009:33) averred that “ .. .where there is no accountability, development will inevitably be stunted.” 
The author (Adegbite, 2009) corroborated thus:  
 In human history, no nation ever prospers with perverse values. 
 In fact, no nation can prosper where personal will supplants the  
general will, where established procedures are observed in the breach, 
 where governance is for self- enrichment rather than public service.  
Where there exists a yawning gap between leadership and stewardship…  
 virtuous societies are built by leaders who are accountable to the  
 led and are driven by the altruistic desire to improve the lot of the 
 highest number of the people. 
The latter part of the above averment adds the dimension of elite complicity in the public accountability and 
corruption dilemma in the country. In an earlier study, Onah and Ibietan (2012: 263-286) under scored this 
(governing) elite factor in public resource mismanagement and corruption in Nigeria. 
How do we account for the origin of corruption in Nigeria? Ikejiani-Clark (2001:114) argued stridently that 
“corruption was more or less introduced in Nigeria by colonialism . Corruption in politics , administration and 
business. .. has its counterpart in similar tendency by the clerk to extract bribe for a file to be moved through the 
process to the Administrator”. She explained further that “ government property was not regarded because it was 
alienated from the population”. 
It is pertinent to note that the contributions of Ikejiani’s_ Clark (2001) in linking the origin of corruption to 
colonialism follows the traditional political - economy approach to blaming all the woes of African society on 
colonial rule. The colonialists departed physically from the Nigerian Political landscape nearly fifty three years 
ago. Tenable arguments must be sought elsewhere.  
Some scholars argued that aspects of African cultural and religious practices predisposes one to corruption. To 
buttress this, Bloom in Egwu (2001: 131) “observed that African societies are characterized by a network of gift 
- giving and gift taking”. He posited further thus : 
That our families, ethnic relations, religious groups and cultural societies 
 encourage corruption is amply demonstrated in the demands and 
 expectations placed on people during festivals , ceremonies and  
other religious feasts, such as Christmas, New Year, Easter and Id-El-fitrs.  
Egwu (2001) clearly resonated with a Biblical and Quranic allusion that “ it is better to give than to receive, 
because giving is a token symbolism of superioty and power” With respect to the above cultural explanation for 
corruption, Kolade (2001:81) countered saying “ this is erroneous on several counts”, as it ignores the prevailing 
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norms in traditional gift - giving. The norms are:  
•  The gifts are modest in proportion , and are to be given for favours received, not for favours expected.  
• The gifts may be accepted, but should never be demanded 
• Each party to the exchange considers it a matter of honour to ensure that their own part of the exchange 
has been faithfully performed. 
 Corruption must be seen as one of the major obstacles to consolidating democratic governance in 
developing countries (Nigeria inclusive), and an efficient system of public accountability with 
transparency as a corollary and tenet of good governance offer a remedy in this regard. The next section of 
this paper focuses on conceptual discourse. Accordingly, corruption and public accountability will be 
explained 
 
2.Conceptual Clarification  
 The concepts of Corruption and public accountability will be discussed in this sections 
 2.1 The Concept of Corruption 
 Attempts at defining concepts in social and management sciences have not been easy in view of the behavioural 
inclination of these disciples. The concept of Corruption is not an exception to this. Various Scholars see it from 
different perspectives depending on their orientation. 
 Nye in Onwuka, Okoh and Eme (2009:11) see corruption as deviant behaviour and progressed to define it thus: 
Corruption is a deviation from the formal duties of a public role 
 because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique) 
pecuniary exercise of certain types of private regarding influence.  
This includes such behaviour as bribery (use of reward to pervert the 
 judgment of a person in position of trust); nepotism (appointment by 
 reason of astcriptive relationship rather than merit); and misapp 
ropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private  
 regarding uses). 
The above definition appear rather clumsy for analysis, especially by the choice of words or syntax. Its 
usefulness however lies in the attempt to characterise corruption as deviation from the norm (in ordered 
societies), pecuniary motive, bribery, nepotism and misappropriation of public resources to achieve private 
advantage. 
 Another way of conceptualizing corruption is to see it as : 
…the abuse of public office through the instrumentality of private 
 agents, who actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies and 
 process for competitive advantage and profit . Beyond bribery, public office  
 can also be abused for personal benefit through patronage and nepotism, 
 for example the theft of state assets or the diversion of state revenues (Bello-  
Imam in Onwuka, Okoh ,and Eme, 2009;117). 
It is pertinent to note the comprehensive nature of the above definition and the negative correlation between 
corruption and development. This manifests in circumventing public policies and process solely for personal 
gains, public office that should be built on trust is abused and converted to selfish advantage through outright 
theft or diversion of public resources. 
 Ogbuke and Enojo (2007:63) building on the works of Hornby (2001) see “corruption as a dishonest 
illegall behaviour” , especially of people in authority or the act of making somebody change from moral to 
immoral standards of behaviour.” This view adds an ethical /behavioural dimension to this discourse, and it 
suggests that unless sound moral principles anchored on enduring cultural values and practices are imbibed, the 
anti-graft campaign could amount to chasing shadows , especially in a country like Nigeria. These authors 
asserted unequivocally that “top level corruption is often controlled by hidden networks and represents the sum 
of various levels and types of irregular behaviour including abuse of power, conflict of interest, extortion , 
tribalism, nepotism or fraud”. 
 In corroborating this ethical angle to the conceptualization of corruption, Ifesinachi (2004: 79) captured it “as all 
those behavioural orientations that impinge on and necessarily vitiates and destroys rules and basis of public and 
political conduct”. He linked corruption in political and public life to “natural human factors of greed and 
ambition for social-psychological, economic and political power”. Poverty and serious economic hardships are 
often added as part of the motivations for corruption in Nigeria. This argument may be tenable for petty 
corruption as against grand corruption in public office. Petty or survival corruption according to Onwuka, Okoh 
and Eme (2009:119) “ is practiced by civil servants, who may be grossly, underpaid and depend on small rents 
from the public to feed their families and pay school fees.” Grand corruption which translates to kleptomania 
occurs among “high public officials and it often involves large sums of money”. In whatever form corruption 
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manifests, empirical l studies have shown that it impinges on national development efforts as epitomised in the 
link between higher levels of corruption and lower investment and economic growth (Mamro in Ogbuke and 
Enojo, 2007:63). 
 In operationalising high-level or grand corruption, Kolade (2001; 78) sees it “ as the abuse of an influential 
position for private gain, and… as the exploitation of a system for securing unmerited advantage”. The first part 
of the definition according to him relates to holders of influential positions (in public office, bureaucracy and 
private sector) who have access to national economic resources in their vantage positions as custodians and 
stewards of these resources . “ The second part relates to people who lobby such office holders for access to 
preferential or undue advantage”. He referred to both groups as agents of corruption. It is obvious from the al 
locative inefficiency and distributional inequities in Nigeria’s public life, that access to public office confers 
enormous power on those saddled with political and economic management and it takes unusual /uncommon 
discipline to resist the urge or “ temptation for corruption” in the words of Shinkafi in Idemudia (2008:513). 
 Implied in the foregoing explanations are what Ikejiani-Clark (2001b:111-112) characterised as public office-
centered; public interest –centered and market centered definitions. To underscore this, the characterisation of 
corruption are as varied and was documented by Onwuka, Okoh, and Eme (2009:119) as follows: “according to 
the rule” where an official receives private gains for doing his/her job; against the rule “ where he / she is bribed 
to do that which he/she is prohibited from”. There is also petty or survival corruption and grand corruption 
(earlier discussed) . Corruption can also be classified based on the arena it occurs namely: Political , Economic, 
Bureaucratic , Judicial and Moral . Political corruption may manifest in activities connected with elections and 
succession, taking the form of manipulating people and institutions to retain power or office. Economic 
corruption could assume the subversion of institutional regulations and circumventing procedures to get 
unmerited advantage. 
 Bureaucratic corruption goes beyond obtaining pecuniary benefits . It includes cronyism, favouritism, nepotism, 
and associated ills that warrant merit to be slaughtered on the altar of mediocrity in recruitment , promotion and 
motivation of employees as necessary planks upon which personnel administration rests and offer cardinal 
explanations for low productivity, inefficiency and poor service delivery in the public sector. Judicial corruption 
implies perversion of justice, compromising attitudinal disposition of law enforcement agents /agencies, sundry 
ills and avoidable human errors in the administration of justice. Moral corruption entails committing morally 
reprehensible acts deliberately and on a sustained basis.  
 In adducing reasons or explanations for corruption and other unethical conducts in Nigeria, IKejiani- 
Clark( 2001 a 130-133) reported that “ the complexities of modernity and the fact of cultural transmission have 
resulted in unsettled value systems” . These unsettled value systems must be explained in the context of interface 
of Nigerian cultural values with those of the capitalist west, economic interaction and inherited capitalist 
economic systems and values which infused western behavioural patterns /values into the Nigerian culture. 
Others are : lack of commitment to public cause, generalized poverty of Nigerians, infrastructural deficit or non 
existent social services, political interference characterized by spoils system in administrative and political 
practice. 
 2.2 The Concept of Public Accountability 
In the common or ordinary sense, accountability presupposes that an official or person who has been assigned 
duties should be held responsible for his/her actions and the consequences emanating from them. Takaya (1989: 
61) took this point further with references to organizational contexts, and defined accountability as “an official 
personal obligations to carry out assigned duties or activities and be responsible for results or outcomes”  
 Adegbite (2009:33) conceptualized accountability as “ the obligation to demonstrate that work has been 
conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards and the officer reports fairly and accurately on 
performance results”. Implied in the above definition are the indispensable roles of due process, transparency 
and feedback in achieving accountability.  
Some scholars insist that transparency is a corollary of accountability and both are essential planks upon which 
democratic governance and development anchor (Olowu, 2002: 139) Idemudia , 2008:502 and Ujah, 2010:77). 
 Olowu (2002:140) posited that “accountability refers to answerability for one’s actions or behaviour” He 
corroborated that it has three crucial components namely: a clear definition of responsibility, reporting 
mechanisms, and a system of review , rewards and sanctions. From the foregoing, it is deductible that 
responsibility, feedback and transparency underline accountability . What (then) is public accountability? 
 Ujah (2010:78) operationalised it as “ a system whereby public officers are made to give account of their 
stewardship to members of the public”. He progressed to explain the term “ public” as referring to the generality 
of the populace, the people or segment of the society particularly touched by the subject matter on which an 
account is demanded. It is important to note that public interest is supposed to be crucial to public accountability . 
If this is so, why do public office holders and civil/public servants work against public interest?. In other words, 
public bureaucracy and policy making are expected to reinforce public administration and then galvanize service 
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delivery but this rarely happens in Nigeria due to the character of the actors and leading elite in the public 
bureaucracy process. 
 In an attempt to exonerate the bureaucratic class, Adebayo (2000:20) argued that “officials are constantly 
conscious of public accountability and are, therefore, anxious not to make mistakes that would expose them, and 
the system they operate , to public crictism”. This paper contend that the above assertion does not reflect the 
correct and current situation and practice in the Nigerian public bureaucracy. We affirm further that the averment 
belies the inefficiency , ineptitude and general rot as exemplified by various and several media reports of 
corruption , nepotism and sundry malfeasance in the public service.  
 The notion of public accountability therefore is premised on the fact that public servants and office holders hold 
their positions and everything connected thereto as trusts for the people ( the true and general public) who are 
expectedly their masters, and they must render proper accurate and timely accounts of successes or failures to the 
public .  
Transparency is therefore very cardinal to accountability and it stands to good reasoning that all forms of secrecy 
and shady dealings detract from effective and proper practice of accountability. 
 Accountability can be typologised into: financial; administrative, political and social. Financial accountability 
translates to obligation on the part of an official handling resources, public office or other positions of trust to 
report on the intended and actual use of the resources . This calls for transparent process / procedures to attain 
this. Administrative accountability involves critical internal systems of control that can ensure or complement 
effective checks and balances. Adherence to or enforcement of Civil Service Rules, Financial Instructions and 
other Due Process instruments are tangential to achieving this. Political accountability entails orderly and 
reliable systems of election , effective legislative oversight functions /control mechanisms, distinct and effective 
separation of powers that guarantees serving the pubic interest . Social accountability necessitates a demand 
driven approach that relies on productive civic engagement as bastion for greater public accountability. The 
foregoing require clear application of standards and access to information for utmost effectiveness. 
 In a related discourse, Idemudia (2008:508) reported that “public auditing and reporting give effect to ( public) 
accountability”. Building on a 1998 UNDP report, he categorized accountability in relation to audit types thus: 
Fiscal accountability requires financial and compliance audit; management accountability demands efficiency 
and economy audit; programme accountability needs effectiveness audit, and individual accountability with 
focus on transparency calls for investigation . Public accountability must underscore prudent and effective public 
financial management. Sound principles of accountability demands that government at all levels ensure that 
public funds and resources are judiciously utilized and be backed with adequate and appropriate records. 
 Why is it important to have accountability in the public sector? Olowu (2002: 140-142) canvassed the following 
reasons in response to the above question: *Accountability is necessary for the efficient functioning of all 
organizations, especially the public sector in democratically governed states. *Accountability structures in the 
public sector are surrogates for market forces in non market situations helping to reflect the preferences of the 
public as citizens and consumers in the public domain . It also serves as a quality control device by ensuring that 
those who hold public trust account for the trust to the citizens, and it is expected to reinforce the superiority of 
the public will over private interests especially in the provision and delivery of services to the public. 
Accountability is closely linked to the enjoyment of democratic life and democratic governance supposedly 
implies the supremacy of citizens in the governing process. 
 *Accountability is one of the five norms of good governance, the rest are efficiency; transparency, rule of law, 
and legitimacy. * Interest in public sector accountability is motivated by the need to curb waste occasioned by 
inefficient use of public resources and collusion between the top bureaucratic and political class in rent-seeking 
and sundry corrupt practices.*The need for efficient management of the meagre resources in the face of rising 
expectations from the populace for service delivery calls for proper accountability in the public sector. *The 
increasing role of multi-lateral financial institutions , donors and actors through aid giving, technical and other 
forms of official assistance has increased the demand for accountability in order to improve governance and 
galvanise development. 
In order to achieve the foregoing or enforce accountability , a number of strategies (mechanisms ) are advocated 
namely: internal ; external voice; and exit options. Internal mechanisms are those used by organizations to 
enforce compliance (of workers) or conformity with organizational goals. This include hierarchy reinforced by 
inspectorates, merit system of recruitment linked to education, training and retraining aimed at improving 
workers skills. Other internal mechanisms include rules and regulations (codes of conduct); other operative 
functions of HR management and procedures for internal reviews and audits. 
 External mechanisms are created and applied by agencies /organs outside the formal organization of the civil 
service in form of executive - based compliance systems such as Ministerial control of civil servants, Minister’s 
accounting duty to the cabinet, the parliament and electorate. Legislative controls on the civil service entail 
parliamentary committees investigative powers through audit, scrutiny of drafts of executive bills, appropriation 
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bills, screening of political appointees, heads of independent commissions and ambassadors. There can also be 
parliamentary questions, letters to Minister’s, summons and debates. The judiciary provides the citizens as 
victims of administrative actions/ inaction contrary to law with judicial remedies like order of mandamus, 
certiorari, habeascopus, natural justice , ultra vires , rule of law and ombudsman to mention but a few. Some 
countries have specialized agencies to investigate abuse of office, misuse of power or anti- graft campaigns/war 
such as EFCC and ICPC in Nigeria. 
Exit opportunities are utilized where goods and services are produced by various service providers . Utilities 
such as electric power, water supply and telecommunications offer ready examples here , and privatization ; 
commercialization; joint enterprises ; strengthening small /medium /micro enterprises can be useful here. 
 Voice mechanisms afford citizens opportunities to express their feelings about maltreatment or abuse of 
position/public resources by office holders. It is important to emphasise the role of elections in voting out non- 
performers as instrument for ensuring public accountability. Other mechanism for enforcing accountability 
include decentralization of powers , responsibilities and resources, grievance ventilation through Ombudsman; 
right / access to information ; activities of interests and pressure groups. A combination of environmental, socio-
cultural , political, economic, religious beliefs and geographical factors can inhibit the foregoing mechanisms 
from effectively enforcing accountability in the Nigerian public sector (see Ujah, 2010: 83-86 for details) . 
 
3. Corruption and Public Accountability in Nigeria: A Discourse 
 The basis for tackling this section of the paper has been laid in the preceding segment (conceptual clarification). 
The task here is to identify and discuss the link between corruption and public accountability in Nigerian public 
sector. It must be stated unequivocally that the test parametre for measuring an accountable government lies in 
the extent to which it can tolerate corruption or how far it would go in fighting corruption. It is common 
knowledge that corruption largely explains Nigerians consistent poor performance on the Human Development 
Index (HDI), infrastructural deficits, socio-economic instability, impediments to foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flow, and lack of development generally . 
 Obuah(2010:17) was more pungent in reporting “…that corruption accounts for 20 percent of the GDP of 
Nigeria…(and) for several years, Nigeria has been at the bottom of Traspaency Intern atonal (TI) Corrupt 
Perception Index (CPI) ranking”. Successive administrations in Nigeria have designed measures and initiatives 
at combating corruption ranging from the Criminal Code (section 98-115); penal code; 1976 corrupt practices 
decree; Shagari’s ethical revolution to combat corruption through the introduction of code of conduct for public 
servants; Buhari/Idiagbon’s War Against Indiscipline; Babangida’s ethical and social mobilization crusade , the 
creation of Special Fraud Unit of Nigeria Police Force. There are also legislative acts and functional schemes 
supposedly designed to fight graft such as the Banks and other Financial Institutions Act (1991) the financial 
malpractices in Banks Act (1994); the Advance Fee Fraud and other related offences Act (1995); the 
Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences (ICPC) Act (2000) ; the Economic and Financial 
Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2002; Budget Monitoring ad Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU) , otherwise 
known as “Due Process Mechanism”. 
As laudable as the above gestures are, they have not been able to effectively address the corruption dilemma, 
even as the country is perceived as a “crippled giant, a veritable modern wasteland, a nation where corruption is 
extolled as national culture...” (Ojukwu and Shopeju, 2010:15) . This can be explained by the desire of political 
office holders and public officers to use their positions of trust and authority to perpetuate corrupt activities. 
Available literature traced the origin and growth of corruption in Nigeria to the colonial period when “ court 
messengers and native authority used their privileged positions to appropriate wealth for themselves…” 
( Ikejiani-Clark, 2001b:113). This author also documented the setting up of Foster Sutton Commisssion of 
Enquiry by the Colonial Office in Britain to probe allegations of mismanagement and corrupt practices in 
African Continental Bank plus charges of improper conduct leveled against Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe as the founder 
of the Bank. Ikejiani-Clark (2001b: 116) reported that this was as attempt to embarrass Dr Azikwe as no case of 
corruption was established.  
The Coker Commission of Enquiry was also instituted in 1962 to look into allegations of corruption and 
diversion of funds by Chief Awolowo and some leading members of his party into private use. It was held that 
funds were moved through the Marketing Board and the National Investment and Properties Company controlled 
by the Western state government. Chief Awolowo was exonerated but the direction of the use of funds was 
condemned (Ikejiani-Clark, 2001b: 116-117) . 
Ojukwu and Shopeju (2010:17, 20 ) recorded that corruption was adduced as one of the reasons for the first 
military coup in 1966. The military kept hanging on to this factor to justify every successful coup, but the cure 
turns out to be worse than the disease and the country pays adversely for it. We contend that a fundamental 
explanation of perpetuation of corruption is weak or non - accountability, relative anonymity which is fertilised 
by absolute discretion.  
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In a similar discourse, Egwu (2001;126-147) using the social system theory to analyse “the psycho-dynamics of 
corruption in Nigeria” presented an audacious and point blank account. He argued that probes and commissions 
of enquiry never lead to punishment of culprints, especially government officials who commit corruption. Apart 
from the Forster- Sutton Panel and Coker Commission of Inquiry (1962) on Eastern and Western Nigeria 
respectively, he identified the following : Joda Commission of Inquiry in Northern Nigeria (1967) ; Asset 
Investigation Panel of 1975-1976 instituted by the Murtala /Obasanjo regime which found 10 of the 12 
Governors under Gowon regime guilty of enriching themselves through corruption , graft and fraud; the probes 
into FESTAC 77 leyland buses and cement importation scandals which found some notable politicians guilty ; 
the 1984 Awoniyi Panel in Niger State under Governor Anwal Ibrahim over illegal contracts and corrupt 
payments in respect of Bi-Water project, Buhari initiated several panels to investigate the Shagari administration 
and found many governors and high ranking politicians guilty of corruption. Babangida set up a panel to 
investigate the Buhari administration, , so did Abacha to look into the administration of Babangida.  
On thorough scrutiny, most of the above actions amount to subterfuge to divert public attention elsewhere. For 
instance, Obuah (2010:24) asserted that “ … an official report indicated that an estimated $12.2 billion had been 
side-tracked to off - budget accounts from 1988 through 1993.. He further hinted that “Transparency Initiative’s 
Global Corruption Report listed General Sani Abacha (1993-98) among the top ten presidents who had allegedly 
embezzled between two and five billion dollars”. It was also recorded that during the eight years of Obasanjo 
civil administration , Nigeria lost a minimum average of $4billion to $8billion annually to corruption. It has 
equally been estimated (by EFCC sources) “ that between 1960 and 1999, about $220 billion or $380 billion has 
been plundered and squandered by public officials in Nigeria” ( Obuah, 2010: 23) . The narrative added that this 
is more than six times the amount the USA provided for the post World War II reconstruction of Europe under 
the Marshall Plan.  
Transparency International’s records posited that corruption accounts for about 20 percent of Nigeria’s GDP. It 
is painful to also learn that the country was identified among the top nations in the over $1 trillion annually paid 
globally in bribes (Malgwi in Obuah, 2010:18) The implication of these is that the internal and external 
mechanisms plus other options of upholding accountability is either weak or outrightly ineffectively. It is 
doubtful if the country can join the league of big players globally in economic growth and development 
generally.  
Various reports (apart from the foregoing) in the media (print, broadcast and social networks) attest to the fact 
that corruption has attained a mega status in Nigeria with high level sophistication in its modus operandi, 
especially during this democratic dispensation. It is plausible to argue that the theatres of corruption permeate the 
Nigerian federal structure from the federal government to the local government and their bureaucracies. We 
contend that for as long as the fraud triangle of need, opportunity and weak sanctions subsists, corruption will 
not be tamed and it will continue to have more active converts. Virtually all the corruption cases of politically 
exposed persons (PEPs) handled under this democratic experiment including the latest (Maina’s) show that the 
judiciary has demonstrated within its self-inflicted affliction to be a dubious ally in the corruption conundrum, 
especially through carefully orchestrated plea bargaining and procured judgments.  
It must be stated clearly that for as long as the leadership of the country plays with corruption the consequences 
are bound to be grave and these include : weakening of public bureaucracy; diversion of scarce resources from 
public purposes to private ends; perversion of political and administrative decisions through lobbying and 
clandestine manipulations; deceleration in economic progress/ development; lack of commitment to national 
values and civic responsibilities. 
 
4. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Through a heavy reliance on secondary sources of data backed by the analytical approach, the paper observed 
that corruption in Nigeria predates the independence. Predicated on the works of some scholars, it was reported 
that aspects of African cultural and religious practices predispose to corrupt practices among public office 
holders /officials, although Kolade (2001) argued otherwise with reasons . The importance of public 
accountability and its link with transparency in stemming corruption were highlighted . The mechanism for 
enforcing public accountability namely: internal , external , voice and exit options were thoroughly discussed 
and their weaknesses in redressing corruption in the Nigerian public life were exposed.  
 In order to address the omission in the system of public accountability in Nigeria and strengthen its mechanisms 
in attenuating corruption in the country, the paper recommends as follows: 
(1) Adherence to internal mechanisms for enforcing accountability should be total. Attitudinal reorientation 
is required on the part of top bureaucrats in the discharge of their duties and in reinforcing the various 
internal controls that guarantee merit in the recruitment system and other operative functions of human 
resource management.  
(2)  Institutions of governance once created takes a life of their own. Therefore, deliberate attempts should 
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be made to ensure that these institutions are built on sound ethical values and orientations, their 
operators should be made to go through and imbibe enduring moral training and virtues that can be 
passed on to future generations in order to guarantee rectitude , transparency and accountability in 
public service. These can redress the decadence in agencies and organs of government, especially 
watchdog institutions such as judiciary, police and anti graft bodies.  
(3) Stiffer penalties /sanctions for corrupt practices is also canvassed. The current provisions in the 
laws/statute books offer limited or no deterrence to actual and potential offenders. Corruption and 
similar offences should attract capital punishment as practised in China. The legislature can do this by 
reversing itself through discipline and probity in office to enact laws that can halt the country’s 
downward plunge or regression into abyss. 
(4) A general reorientation of the populace is a necessary condition in electing credible leaders at polls. 
Leaders with moral convictions and driven by altruistic service delivery are likely to possess the 
required political will to address the corruption conundrum and sundry self-afflicted ills. 
(5) Whistle blowing and protection for the blowers should be strengthened to nip all the negative devices 
and tendencies in the bud. 
(6) It is commonplace to emphasise that the present deceleration and selective prosecution of the antigraft 
war should be reversed through purposeful and determined vigour to rid the Nigerian public life of 
corruption and allied infractions on a sustainable basis.  
(7) All inhibitions to the full and effective operations of the FOI Act through the perpetuation of official 
Secrets Acts and regulations /practices of similar and allied mandates should be removed or repealed. 
This is with a view to upholding transparency as a corollary of accountability in the Nigerian public 
service and public affairs. 
(8) The attempt and romance with Public –Private Partnership should be invigorated, so that government at 
all levels can divest themselves of functions , duties and services (thus stop creating “ jobs for the boys” 
that will not be done or poorly executed) that can be better offered by the private sector, thereby 
releasing resources into vital areas that the public sector is traditionally equipped to handle.  
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